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Abstract. While social media is a new and exciting technology, it has the 
potential to be misused by organized crime groups and individuals involved in 
the illicit drugs trade. In particular, social media provides a means to create new 
marketing and distribution opportunities to a global marketplace, often 
exploiting jurisdictional gaps between buyer and seller. The sheer volume of 
postings presents investigational barriers, but the platform is amenable to the 
partial automation of open source intelligence. This paper presents a new 
methodology for automating social media data, and presents two pilot studies 
into its use for detecting marketing and distribution of illicit drugs targeted at 
Australians. Key technical challenges are identified, and the policy implications 
of the ease of access to illicit drugs are discussed.  
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1   Introduction 
Much of the focus in cybersecurity research is on technology enabled crimes, which 
were previously unknown before the widespread adoption of the Internet1.  These 
types of crimes are those which are dependent on the new technologies, such as 
distributed denial of service attacks, which have no direct correlate outside the 
Internet [2].  On the other hand, many traditional crime types have made extensive 
use of the capability provided by the Internet, making it easier to commit such crimes.  
These technology enhanced crimes include various types of scams, such as 419 and 
employment scams, whose distribution previously was only limited by the cost of 
postage [3].  With the rise of free e-mail and often free Internet access, the cost of 
sending scam emails is effectively nil. 
While traditional crimes have adapted to the new technology, the technologies 
themselves have also been increasing in scope and reach.  The advent of "Web 2.0" 
technologies, including social media - often accessed by mobile devices - has 
                                                          
1 See Stabek et al [1] for a classification scheme. 
radically transformed the user mix and the functionality available to users. It has also 
opened up new avenues for security threats to emerge and spread: the Koobface worm 
is a great example of this [4]. 
In this paper, we consider how social media technologies could be used to enhance 
criminal activity, and develop a generic approach to implement an intelligence based 
approach to understand the extent and nature of the threat.  As an example, we 
investigate how illicit drugs are being quite openly traded through social media.  This 
is in contrast to recent reports that much of this activity is being carried out through 
layers of anonymisation [5]; as we will see, the hallmarks of Internet based crime - 
such as fostering threats outside of the target jurisdiction, while servicing customers 
internationally [6] - are all present with the use of social media in the drugs trade. 
In addition to understanding how to automate the gathering and analysis of source 
material from social media, which may indicate trading in illicit drugs, we further 
consider how to more actively identify individuals and criminal organisations who 
may be targeting a specific country.  In this sense, we propose to use social media 
connectedness - which is an asset to organised crime groups - as a means to identify 
those who are likely to be buying or selling illicit drugs locally [7]. 
In the following sections, we propose a methodology - known as Automated Social 
Media Intelligence Analysis (ASMIA) - which we then apply to two different but 
related problems in understanding how social media is being utilised in illicit drugs 
trade, especially advertising and distribution. Although ASMIA is used to manually 
process open source intelligence in the results of the experiments presented in this 
paper, there is great potential for each stage to be automated, in order to assist 
analysts in carrying out investigations. The potential for applying data mining 
techniques to automate the processing of source material has been widely recognized 
[8]. 
2   Automated Social Media Intelligence Analysis (ASMIA) 
ASMIA operates by either passive monitoring or active searching of a number of 
sources, using query terms which are constructed from noun phrases and verb phrases 
which are then combined to form search terms.  Such a simple approach works well 
for English, since the role of case – where noun forms are changed to denote its 
grammatical role – is limited [9].  
All terms are then added to a term list, which can then be either monitored or 
searched for actively.  When a term returns a hit, this may relate to a target such as an 
individual, organisation, drug etc from which entities can be extracted [10] and from 
which or reasoning can be based, using an expert system or similar approach [11]. 
The algorithm can be described as follows, with examples related to illicit drug trade 
detection: 
 
1. Identify data source(s) to be monitored for the presence of one or more 
terms. 
EXAMPLE: Google ads, Facebook ads, Google search, Facebook profiles, 
Pipl etc 
 
2. Determine whether the data source is suitable for passive monitoring or 
active searching 
EXAMPLE: A sample of Google ads can be harvested by repeatedly 
refreshing a search page where a relevant term has been entered.  
 
3. Develop a term list which can be used for searching or monitoring. 
EXAMPLE: List of illegal drug names. 
 
4. A term list may comprise a list of targets (individuals, groups, 
drugs/chemicals) and their online attributes. 
EXAMPLE: List of persons of interest, known or suspected to be involved in 
selling drugs online, and links to their Facebook page. 
 
5. A term list may be either a simple list or be derived from an ontology or a 
directed graph. 
 
6. An ontology is a tree which is used to represent knowledge in a form which 
can be used for reasoning and inference.  
EXAMPLE: An ontology could be constructed showing the possible 
precursor pathways for all illegal drugs, and these could be added to the term list. 
Ontologies already exist for legal drugs (eg, http://rxnav.nlm.nih.gov/) 
 
7. A directed graph can be used to represent the relatedness of entities with a 
weight indicating the strength of the relationship between two entities, which 
can then be used for inferences. 
EXAMPLE: A group of drug dealers may all ultimately be linked by a 
common chemical company they use to purchase precursors through several 
intermediaries. 
 
8. An expert system or reasoning engine to use ontologies and/or directed 
graphs to make inferences. 
EXAMPLE: An expert system could reason that someone seeking to buy 
sulfaminic acid and anthranilic acid (both available from alibaba.com) might be 
aiming to produce ice. 
 
9. Analyse, process and report on prevalence, at some regular internal, the 
relationships between entities and the scale of the activity. 
EXAMPLE: 1,000,000 Google ads seeded with terms from the term list 
could be used to report on prevalence on blatant advertising for illicit drugs on an 
annual basis. 
 
ASMIA uses a pipeline architecture, as shown in Figure 1, with each component  
being encapsulated, receiving input from the previous stage and passing output to the 
next stage. Thus, it is very amenable to each component being enhanced without 
modifying the architecture at all. This means, for example, that a verb phrase 
processing component could be enhanced to include stemming, which might improve 
the accuracy of an ontology-based search, without affecting the activity of other 
components (other than to seek overall improvements in accuracy and precision). 
In the rest of the paper, we present the results of two experiments, both using 
active search and a range of search terms that are of particular relevance to the illicit 
drug trade targeting Australians. The preliminary results are then discussed in terms 
of their relevance for law enforcement, as well as the broader theoretical issues which 
arise from the implementation of ASMIA. 
 
 
Fig. 1. ASMIA Pipeline Architecture 
 
3   ASMIA Experiment 1 - Ecstasy and Ketamine Distribution and 
Advertising 
To explore prevalence, Google search was selected as the data source, and active 
monitoring was used. Two synthetic drugs were selected to represent a range of 
prevalence in the drug marketplace, being ecstasy and ketamine, which have been 
used by 9% and only 1% of the Australian population respectively [12]. Street names 
for these two drugs were identified from  the American Council for Drug Education, 
comprising [Roll, XTC, Adam, and X] for ecstasy and [Special K, Vitamin K] for 
Data Source Identification 
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ketamine, which were all used as noun phrases (without modifiers)2.  Verb phrases 
were selected from synonyms associated distribution [acquisition, bargain, closeout, 
deal, good deal, investment, purchase, steal, value] or selling [advertise, auction, 
bargain, barter, be in business, boost, clinch the deal, close, close the deal, contract, 
deal in, dispose, drum, dump, exchange, handle, hawk, hustle, market, merchandise, 
move, peddle, persuade, pitch, plug, puff, push, put across, put up for sale, retail, 
retain, snow, soft sell, soft soap, spiel, stock, sweet talk, trade, traffic, unload, vend, 
wholesale] as obtained from thesaurus.com. The term list was then searched, using 
boolean operators, and potential avenues for advertising and distributing synthetic 
drugs were identified in the results. 
There was a wide variety of results, but they could be broadly categorised as 
described in the following sections. 
3.1 True Positives 
Actual offers to buy or sell illicit drugs were identified on many occasions. For 
example, searching for "buy ketamine OR sell ecstasy", for example, returned a link 
that provided a list of illicit drugs (primarily synthetic) from an Australian classifieds 
website, which were listed using both street names and full chemical names from "the 
greatest suppliers of Mephedrone, Heroin, Ketamine, methylone, oxycontin e, 
MDMA, MDVP". Drugs for sale included (verbatim): 
 4-MEC 
 Mephedrone (4-MMC) 
 Ecstasy ( Such as : Sky,Gum,Go,Cros,XL) 
 Bulytone (bk-MBDB) 
 MDAI 
 Analgesic Chemical CB1 and CB2 
 CP 47 497 
 CP-55 940 
 HU-210 
 HU-331 
 Ephedrine HCl powder 
 JWH-018 / JWH-200 JWH-250 
 TFMPP 
 2C-E, 2C-I, 2C-P, 2C-B, 2C-T-2 
 DOC, DOI 
                                                          
2 http://www.acde.org/ 
 Bromo DragonFly 
 TCB-2 
 5-Meo-DMT 
 4-Aco-DMT 
 4-Ho-MIPT 
 4-Meo-PCP 
 Naphyrone 
 Heroin. 
 Methylone (bk-MDMA) 
 BENZO anger. 
 Pure Magic, 
 Bonsai, 
 Smoke 
 Chocolate, 
 Special New Formula. 
 Special gold. 
 Methedrone (BK-PMMA, Methoxyphedrine) 
 Fluoromethamphetamine 2-(2-FMA) 
 Pyrrolidinopropiophenone (a PPP). 
 MDPV (Methylenedioxypyrovalerone, MDPK) 
 Testosterone 
 JWH-073, 1-butyl-3-(1-naphthoyl) indole 
 Hydrocodone 
 Dimethocaine (Larocaine / DMC) 
 Morphine 
 JWH-018, 1-pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl) indole 
 Herione 
 Fluoroamphetamine 4-(4-FA, 4-FMP, or flux) 
 Ketamine  
An e-mail address was provided, location stated as Canberra, with delivery taking a 
maximum of two days. Similar posts from the email address were found from 
February 2012, so there were six clear months of evidence for trading available. 
This list of drugs is extremely broad, representing stimulants, heroin, synethetics, 
hallucinogenics, analgesics, steroids etc 
3.2 False Positives 
These appeared to arise from word-sense disambiguation errors. For example, 
searches for "buy ecstasy" provided links to the Rolls Royce Ecstasy car site. Better 
techniques for word sense disambiguation are required [13]. 
3.3 Trading Advice 
Experiences in buying/selling/using illicit drugs appear to be frequently exchanged 
through social media forums. Examples were found at grasscity.com (“the best 
counter-culture community”), and several Yahoo groups and 4chan threads. 
Usernames and photos identifying the individuals involved could potentially be 
catalogued and cross-referenced within a knowledge base. 
 3.4 “Legal” Alternatives 
Advertising of “legal” alternatives to ecstasy was quite prevalent on social meda sites, 
eg, by clicking a page you would be redirected to another page where you could order 
“safe and legal” bottles (http://www.buyecstasypills.com/), which are advertised as 
being shipped to Australia. The “Rave” pills advertised contain Amino Acids, 
Caffeine, Kava, Citrus aurantium, Pyridoxine HCL, and Riboflavin.  
While some of these substances are legal, others may be illegal to possess and/or 
import under Australian law. For example, since 2007, it has been illegal to import 
kava without a license unless in accompanied luggage for ceremonial purposes by 
Pacific islanders. The company involved is unlikely to have TGA approval. Following 
a progression model of drug addiction, it may be possible to index content on the 
"follower’s" pages to find evidence of use and distribution of illicit drugs. One 
“herbal” site, for example, has a facebook page with 2,029 followers. This hypothesis 
needs to be tested. 
3.5 Market Segmentation 
Some advertising was highly targeted to specific demographics in Australia, eg, 
advertising ketamine and mephedrone on a “tradie” website, with a contact form at 
the bottom. Other advertising was specifically targeting Australians with location 
stated as Darwin (email address of distributor and website supplied). The advertiser 
was also selling ecstasy, MDMA, methamphetamine, MDPV and Fentanyl. The 
advertiser had 334 postings identified by Google across Australia, New Zealand and 
other countries, but some further searching revealed that the advertiser was based in 
Belgium. 
3.6 Definitions 
Some sites provided definitions and associated street names, including 
methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA), "X," "beans," "pills," and "rolls" etc 
without any attempt to engage in sale or distribution. 
3.7 Usage advice 
Some sites provided advice on how to use drugs like ecstasy “safely”, or the medical 
effects, including "will it kill my baby if I take ecstasy while pregnant"? Again, no 
attempt was made to directly market or sell a particular product. 
3.8 Biochemistry 
Several sites provided research and/or biochemical information about drug structures 
and precursors, which were scientific in nature, and not attempt was made to buy or 
sell illicit drugs. 
3.9 Experiment 1 Summary 
In summary, there is strong evidence of quite open advertising of illicit drugs, 
targeted at Australians, even when searching through limited samples. Also, 
combining basic noun and verb phrases to create search terms produces reasonable 
results, but term disambiguation will remain a problem, as will the several categories 
of content into which a posting could be placed. Thus, the categorization task facing 
automation is multi-label, unlike binary classification in cognate fields, such as porn 
site detection [14]. 
One of the challenges for automation will be to reduce false positives, links to 
medical information sites etc and focus solely on true positives, and especially those 
which are targeting specific jurisdictions like Australia. Furthermore, new facts which 
are extracted from social media need to be integrated more broadly with other 
knowledge and intelligence from sources such as prisons [15]. 
4   ASMIA Experiment 2 - Social Network Advertising 
In this experiment, we examined whether advertising in social media was being 
targeted to users who list their interests in illicit substances. The procedure was as 
follows: 
 An account was setup with a major social networking site, with the 
hometown/current location set to Australia. 
 A list of amphetamine precursors and other common stimulants in Oceania as 
noun phrases were entered into a term list (derived from  Schloenhardt, [16]). 
 The terms were entered sequentially into the search function, and if one or 
more pages were available for each term, the top page was added to the user's 
list of interests. This list was used to generate advertising which is considered 
relevant to that user's interests. 
 Over a 3 month period, advertisements that were generated in response to the 
term list that might be associated with the sale or distribution of illicit drugs 
was logged. 
Step 3 yielded some interesting results: as an example, searching for phentermine 
(Schedule 4, script only in Australia) resulted in a top hit "community page", which in 
turn had a user-contributed link to www.ipharmastore.net. This online store sells 
phentermine for US$226.86 per pack (without the need for an Australian 
prescription), and they even list a local Melbourne phone number on their website 
(0399886362). In turn, this number has been reportedly linked to PC servicing scam 
phone calls (http://whocallsme.com/Phone-Number.aspx/0399886362). The company 
appears to be selling and distributing the drugs from the Philippines, as their website 
indicates that they are licensed by the Department of Health, Bureau Food and Drugs 
(and not by any Australian authority). 
While there were many individual pages associated with each of the terms, there 
was no advertising detected that was targeted towards the sale and distribution of 
illicit drugs. Perhaps this reflects the greater level of vetting applied to online 
advertising, as opposed to user-contributed content. For example, Facebook’s 
advertising guidelines clearly prohibit the promotion of illicit or recreational drugs 
[17]. 
 
5   Discussion 
Social networking clearly provides avenues for the sale, marketing and distribution of 
illicit drugs and/or for the abuse of legal drugs which have not been prescribed. There 
is clear evidence that drug dealers are targeting Australians in both of these 
categories, promoting a disturbingly broad smorgasbord of potentially harmful 
substances. On the positive side, we found no evidence that paid advertising was 
being used to promote illicit drugs, underlining the important role that policy decision 
and enforcement plays in security. 
The methodology we have developed to gather and process raw source material for 
open source intelligence (ASMIA) shows great promise in being able to automate the 
very tedious aspects of source identification and assistance with linking new facts 
with existing intelligence product. Yet longstanding problems with word sense 
disambiguation and deeper-level semantic processing will remain. These remain 
active areas of research within natural language engineering. In this study, we only 
examined sites which were in English; a complication would be the cross-referencing 
and indexation of non-English language sites [18].  Trust in distributed systems 
remains an open problem [19] given the difficulty in scaling in complexity [20]. 
In policy terms, the astonishingly rapid rise of social media – especially on mobile 
devices – and the accompanying introduction of mobile payment systems present 
challenges for law enforcement. The suggested introduction of data retention laws for 
access to websites (including social media) could be a valuable source of data for law 
enforcement agencies who are trying to understand links between posts, which may 
only come to an investigator’s attention after some period of time. Conversely, rather 
than invading the privacy of law-abiding citizens by indexing all postings from every 
social media site, ASMIA could assist in screening out users and sites likely to be of 
interest to law enforcement. An obvious example from this study would be compiling 
an index of e-mail addresses which have been posted quite clearly in advertisement 
for illicit drugs; adding an e-mail address and an attribute indicating that they are 
involved in marketing or distribution of illicit drugs could be extremely helpful in 
identifying social media users likely to be of interest. 
Regulatory reform in the area of the marketing, sale and distribution of legal 
pharmaceuticals – without a prescription – needs to be considered. According to the 
Therapeutics Goods Administration, such medicines can be bought into Australia 
under the traveller’s exemption (incuding opioid analgesics) or the Personal 
Importation Scheme. Given that such drugs are being promoted through social media 
directly to Australians it is likely that this sales channel will grow over time. Thus, we 
suggest that further powers be given to Customs and Quarantine agencies to use 
ASMIA to maintain and index of known suppliers and customers within Australia 
(perhaps using data derived from social media) to assist in the prevention of a more 
organized approach to the sale and distribution of these substances within Australia. 
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